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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I. COURT RECOGNIZES MUNICIPALITIES' CONTROL OVER ELECTRIC
SERVICE PROVIDERS
In Berkeley Electric Cooperative v. South Carolina Public Service
Commission' the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a municipality
may, by franchise agreement, designate an electric supplier to provide
service to a newly annexed area.' The court recognized that municipali-
ties have broad discretion to determine which suppliers may provide
electricity within the corporate limits of the municipality.3
Electric service area rights have been the subject of a nearly
continuous struggle for many years in South Carolina among municipali-
ties, cooperatives, and private companies. Historically, private power
companies were reluctant to provide electricity to rural areas in South
Carolina and other states. Consequently, small municipalities began to
combine to create public utility districts to serve people beyond the city
limits. 4 South Carolina authorized the formation of public utility districts
for electric power in 1933. 5 One successful effort to provide electricity
to small collections of municipalities was the Santee-Cooper Project,
which, like the Tennessee Valley Authority, purchased distribution
facilities from private companies and resold those facilities to coopera-
tives.6
In May, 1935, President Roosevelt established the Rural Electrifica-
tion Administration (REA) "to initiate, formulate, administer, and
supervise a program of approved projects with respect to the generation,
transmission, and distribution of electric energy in rural areas. " '
1. 304 S.C. 15, 402 S.E.2d 674 (1991).
2. Id. at 20, 402 S.E.2d at 677.
3. See id. at 19, 402 S.E.2d at 677 (citing S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 15).
4. THE RESEARCH STAFF, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FuND, ELECTRIC POWER
AND GOVERNMENT POLICY 388-89 (1948) [hereinafter ELECTRIC POWER].
5. Id. at 389 & n.39.
6. Id. at 559-60.
7. Exec. Order No. 7037 (May 11, 1935). See generally RICHARD HELLMAN,
GOVERNMENT COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 28 (1972)
(explaining the impetus for forming the REA).
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Concurrently, South Carolina created its own rural electrification
authority to build 2,400 miles of electric lines to serve rural areas.8
In the second half of the twentieth century, South Carolina experi-
enced growth in business development, and rural areas became more
attractive to private electric suppliers. This expanding urban growth and
rural development resulted in continuous conflict between nonprofit
electric cooperatives and private power companies for opportunities to
provide electric service in developing areas.
In 1969 the South Carolina legislature attempted to resolve these
conflicts by passing the Territorial Assignments Act,9 which generally
provided for the establishment of service area rights for power companies
and electric cooperatives, called "electric suppliers." First, the Act
authorized the Public Service Commission (PSC) to assign service areas
outside of municipalities.1" Most of the assignments resulted from
private agreements between electric suppliers that were approved by the
PSC." The Act also established "corridor rights" that provided electric
suppliers the exclusive right to serve premises within 300 feet on either
side of the provider's existing power lines or lines the provider was
authorized to construct.12 In the event that different electric suppliers had
overlapping corridor rights, the customer was given a choice of
suppliers. 13
In assigning service areas in the early 1970s, the PSC left unas-
signed much of the territory in the vicinity of cities that owned and
operated their own electric systems. Extensions of municipal electric
systems in areas outside municipal limits often require the approval of
the PSC under statutes predating the Territorial Assignments Act. 4
Municipalities continue to expand into once-rural areas, much like private
electric companies prior to the Territorial Assignments Act.' 5
Prior to 1984 the law was ambiguous with respect to the service area
rights assigned by the PSC to areas which were subsequently annexed by
a municipality. The General Assembly then amended the Territorial
Assignments Act to clarify the respective rights of municipalities and
8. ELECTRIC POWER, supra note 4, at 458 n.70.
9. No. 432, 1969 S.C. Acts 740 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. §§
58-27-610 to -670 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1991)).
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-27-640 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
11. ELECTRIC POWER, supra note 4, at 559-60.
12.: S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-27-620(1)(b) & (c) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
13. Id. § 58-27-620(1)(d).
14. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 58-27-1220 to -1280 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp.
1991).
15. Annexation is the statutory means by which municipalities enlarge. See S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-3-10 to -290 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1991) (setting forth
annexation process).
[Vol. 44
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
electric suppliers in areas annexed by municipalities.16 In light of this
background, one can better understand the significance of Berkeley
Electric Cooperative v. South Carolina Public Service Commission.
17
In July 1987 the town of Summerville annexed an undeveloped
parcel of land located within 300 feet of a power line owned by Berkeley
Electric Cooperative ("Berkeley"). Subsequently, a developer built a
restaurant on the parcel and requested electric service from South
Carolina Electric & Gas Co. (SCE&G), which had an exclusive franchise
agreement with Summerville.'I Berkeley filed a complaint with the PSC
contending that its "corridor rights" under the Territorial Assignments
Act superseded any rights of SCE&G as Summerville's franchisee. 19
Berkeley also argued that, although a municipality itself may provide
electric service within corporate limits, the municipality may not
designate a supplier by franchise.' The PSC dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, the supreme court held that, although the Territorial
Assignments Act entitles electric suppliers to provide service to premises
within 300 feet of its electric lines in place on July 1, 1969, the provision
applies only to premises outside the corporate limits of municipalities.21
Consequently, "[a]lthough [Berkeley's] lines were in place on July 1,
1969, . . . [the 'corridor rights' provision] is not applicable as the
premises in question, following annexation, were within corporate
limits. "n
Berkeley also argued that a municipality may not designate another
supplier to serve within the municipality's corporate limits through a
franchise agreement. 3 The court disagreed: "[Berkeley's] contention that
a municipallyfranchised utility should be distinguished from a municipal-
ly-ownedutility effectually denies Summerville's right of consent, leaving
Summerville with the sole alternative of permitting [Berkeley] to provide
the service."24 The court concluded that SCE&G could continue to
provide electric service to the newly annexed parcel.'
16. Act of June 6, 1984, No. 431, 1984 S.C. Acts 1165 (codified at S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 58-27-650 to -690 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1991)).
17. 304 S.C. 15, 402 S.E.2d 674 (1991).
18. Id. at 17, 402 S.E.2d at 675.
19. Id. at 17-18, 402 S.E.2d at 675-76. "Corridor rights" are the rights of an
electricity provider to provide service to an area within 300 feet of the provider's
existing electricity lines. Id. at 17 & n.1, 402 S.E.2d at 675 & n.1; see also S.C.
CODE ANN. § 58-27-620(1)(b) & (c) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
20. Berkeley, 304 S.C. at 17, 402 S.E.2d at 675.
21. Id. at 18,402 S.E.2d at 676 (construing S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-27-620 (Law.
Co-op. 1976)).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 20, 402 S.E.2d at 677.
25. Id.
1992]
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In Berkeley the supreme court recognized its holdings in City of
Abbeville v. Aiken Electric Cooperative6 and Blue Ridge Electric
Cooperative v. City of Seneca27 as controlling.2 8 In Abbeville the court
held that an electric supplier operating in a PSC-assigned service area
that is later annexed can continue to serve existing customers. 29
However, the court also noted that a supplier cannot extend or expand
its service in an annexed area without the municipality's consent.30 In
Blue Ridge the supreme court held that a municipality could either supply
electricity itself to new customers in annexed areas or consent to
expanded service by the previously assigned electric supplier.3,
Notably, the Berkeley court failed to cite City of Rock Hill v. Public
Service Commission,32 an earlier case in which the supreme court held
that cooperatives could not assert "corridor rights" against a municipality
because such rights "may be asserted only against 'electrical suppliers'
which, by definition, excludes municipalities. "33 The Berkeley court's
reliance on article VIII, section 15 of the South Carolina Constitution
makes it more difficult for a legislative change to protect "corridor
rights" from municipal intrusion.
34
In some respects, Berkeley seems to limit the PSC's assignment
power by allowing a municipal franchisee to extend its services into a
newly annexed area regardless of a prior assignment. However, in South
Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v. Berkeley Electric Cooperative,35 the
supreme court recognized a municipality's right to grant nonexclusive
franchise agreements to more than one provider, thereby giving its
citizens a choice of electric suppliers. 36 Because a franchisee must
26. 287 S.C. 361, 338 S.E.2d 831 (1985) (per curiam).
27. 297 S.C. 283, 376 S.E.2d 514 (1989) (per curiam).
28. Berkeley, 304 S.C. at 18-20, 402 S.E.2d at 676-77.
29. Abbeville, 287 S.C. at 370, 338 S.E.2d at 836.
30. Id. at 371, 338 S.E.2d at 836.
31. Blue Ridge, 297 S.C. at 289, 376 S.E.2d at 518. This decision relied on
Abbeville and on the South Carolina Constitution, which states in pertinent part: "No
law shall be passed by the General Assembly granting the right to construct and
operate.., on public property.. . [an] electric plant ... without first obtaining the
consent of the governing body of the municipality in control of the... public places
proposed to be occupied for any such or like purpose ... ." S.C. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 15.
32. 299 S.C. 95, 382 S.E.2d 888 (1989).
33. Id. at 98, 382 S.E.2d at 889 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-27-610(1) (Law.
Co-op. 1976)). The Rock Hill court relied on § 58-27-610(1) instead of the
municipality's constitutional rights as applied in Abbeville and Blue Ridge.
34. Cf. City of Aiken v. Aiken Elec. Co-op., 305 S.C. 466, 409 S.E.2d 403
(1991) (suggesting that a municipality's right to assign service areas within
incorporated areas parallels the PSC's right to make assignments outside the
incorporated area).
35. 411 S.E.2d 218 (S.C. 1991).
36. Id. at 219.
[Vol. 44
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periodically renew its franchise agreement, the franchisee may offer a
municipality concessions for the right to provide services.37
Berkeley may also affect prior decisions such as City of Newberry v.
Public Service Commission.38 In Newberry the supreme court held that
the Home Rule Act39 repealed the right of a municipality under the
Territorial Assignments Act& to serve industrial premises outside the
corporate limits of the municipality.4" Following Berkeley, however,
Newberry could have annexed the area and then served the area as part
of its municipality.42
The irony of this line of South Carolina cases is that private power
suppliers, originally reluctant to enter rural regions, are now battling
over those territories with the cooperatives that were created to fill the
void, and are doing so as beneficiaries of municipal franchises. The
municipality, once the weakest entity involved in the battle, is now a
major decision-maker in allocating the right to provide electric service
in areas that were once within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PSC. In
addition, the General Assembly recently passed an act amending section
4-9-41 of the South Carolina Code to provide for joint administration of
the functions of political subdivisions and adding a chapter to title 4 to
provide for the consolidation of political subdivisions. 43 This newly
enacted legislation may alter a municipality's power to control which
suppliers will provide electric power within the corporate limits of the
municipality.
Joseph Lee Snitzer
II. PROXIMITY TO CHURCH, SCHOOL, OR RESIDENCE ALONE
SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR DENIAL OF BEER AND WINE PERMIT
In Byers v. South Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Commis-
sion4 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the South Carolina
Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission ("Commission") may deny an
application for an off-premises beer and wine sales permit based solely
on the proximity of the proposed location to a church, school, or
37. See generally ELECTRIC POWER, supra note 4, at 109.
38. 287 S.C. 404, 339 S.E.2d 124 (1986).
39. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-27-620(2) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
40. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-60 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
41. Newberry, 287 S.C. at 407, 339 S.E.2d at 125.
42. But cf. Duke Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 300 S.C. 210, 387 S.E.2d
241 (1989) (holding that, without a certificate of public convenience and necessity,
a municipality could not serve contiguous territory already being served by a private
utility company).
43. Act of Apr. 8, 1992, No. 319, 1992 S.C. Acts 1936.
44. 305 S.C. 243, 407 S.E.2d 653 (1991).
1992]
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residence.45 The court found that the 1986 amendment to section 61-9-
320 of the South Carolina Code46 overruled Port Oil Co. v. Allen.47
Accordingly, the supreme court's holding significantly expands the
discretion of the Commission to decide whether a proposed location is
sufficiently suitable for beer or wine sales.
48
The respondent, William Byers, applied to the Commission for a
permit to sell beer and wine for off-premises consumption at his
convenience store. Many residents of the surrounding community
opposed Byers's application. At the Commission's hearing on the
application, citizens offered evidence that Byers's store was located
within one mile of a church, a school, a children's playground, and
private residences.4 9 The citizens also offered evidence that only two
sheriff's deputies were available to patrol the 400-square-mile county in
which the store was located and that the county was already experiencing
trouble with littering, vandalism, and drag racing.50 Based on this
evidence, the Commission denied Byers's application. 1
Thereafter, Byers petitioned the circuit court to review the Com-
mission's decision. 2 Byers requested that the court remand the case to
the Commission so that he could introduce additional evidence to rebut
the citizens' assertions that the proposed location was incompatible with
the welfare of the surrounding rural community.53 Although he was
45. Id. at 246, 407 S.E.2d at 655.
46. Act of Apr. 21, 1986, No. 374, 1986 S.C. Acts 2654 (codified as amended
at S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-9-320 (Law. Co-op. 1990)). Section 61-9-320 provides:
"No permit authorizing the sale of beer or wine may be issued unless: ... (6) The
location of the proposed place of business of the applicant is in the opinion of the
Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission a proper one.. . ." S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-
9-320. The Commission retains sole discretion for granting permits for the sale of
alcoholic beverages. Id. § 61-9-340.
47. 286 S.C. 286, 332 S.E.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that proximity to a
church, school, or residence is not, standing alone, sufficient grounds for denying a
permit to sell beer and wine), overruled by Byers, 305 S.C. 243, 407 S.E.2d 653.
48. See Byers, 305 S.C. at 246, 407 S.E.2d at 655. Byers does not present the
Establishment Clause issues addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Larkin
v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (invalidating a Massachusetts statute
that afforded churches and schools discretion effectively to veto applications for
liquor licenses within 500 feet of the church or school).
49. Byers, 305 S.C. at 244, 407 S.E.2d at 654.
50. Id.
51. Record at 12.
52. Byers, 305 S.C. at 244, 407 S.E.2d at 654. Under § 1-23-380(a), "[a] party
who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency" may
petition the circuit court for review of the agency's decision. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-
23-380(a) (Law. Co-op. 1986).
53. Byers, 305 S.C. at 244, 407 S.E.2d at 654. An aggrieved party may petition
the court for leave to present additional evidence before the agency. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 1-23-380(e) (Law. Co-op. 1986).
[Vol. 44
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represented by counsel at the first hearing, 4 Byers claimed that he had
no notice of the citizens' allegations prior to the hearing and, therefore,
had no fair opportunity to offer rebuttal evidence." The court remanded
the case to the Commission 'to allow Byers an opportunity to introduce
evidence to refute the claims of littering, vandalism, drag racing, and
inadequate police protection in the area. 6
The Commission appealed the circuit court's order,57 claiming the
court erred in remanding the case to the Commission. The Commission
argued that additional evidence on the suitability of the proposed location
would be immaterial and that Byers did not demonstrate a legitimate
reason for failing to present this evidence at the first hearing.59 Conclud-
ing that the trial court erred in remanding the case to the Commission,
the supreme court reversed the lower court's decision.'
The supreme court determined that the trial judge's reliance on Port
Oil Co. v. Allen61 was an error of law because the supreme court
concluded thtt the 1986 legislative amendment to section 61-9-320 of the
South Carolina Code62 overruled Port Oil.63 The court concluded that
additional evidence would be immaterial to the Commission's determina-
tion because the Commission properly could have denied Byers's
application solely on the basis of the store's proximity to a church,
school, or residence.'
The Byers decision gives virtually unbridled discretion to the
Commission in issuing beer and wine permits. Accordingly, the court's
interpretation of the 1986 amendment seems overly broad. Although the
54. Record at 1.
55. Byers, 305 S.C. at 244, 407 S.E.2d at 654.
56. Id. at 244-45, 407 S.E.2d at 654.
57. Id. at 244, 407 S.E.2d at 654.
58. Brief of Appellant at 1.
59. Id. at 1, 3-7. The circuit court may remand the case to the Commission to
present additional evidence only if "it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that
the additional evidence is material and that there were good reasons for failure to
present it in the proceeding before the agency." S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(e)
(Law. Co-op. 1986).
60. Byers, 305 S.C. at 244-45, 407 S.E.2d at 654-55. "In considering such an
application, 'the [sic] taking of additional evidence is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial [sic] judge.'" Id. at 245, 407 S.E.2d at 654 (quoting Cloyd v.
Mabry, 295 S.C. 86, 90, 367 S.E.2d 171, 173 (Ct. App. 1988)).
61. 286 S.C. 286, 332 S.E.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1985), overruled by Byers, 305
S.C. 243, 407 S.E.2d 653.
62. Act of Apr. 21, 1986, No. 374, 1986 S.C. Acts 2654 (codified as amended
at S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-9-320 (Law. Co-op. 1990)).
63. Byers, 305 S.C. at 246, 407 S.E.2d at 655.
64. Id. Because the court determined that additional evidence would be
immaterial to the Commission's determination, the court found it unnecessary to
consider whether the respondent had a good reason for failing to introduce the
evidence at the first hearing. Id.
1992]
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legislature amended section 61-9-320 apparently in response to the Port
Oil decision,' it is not clear that the legislature intended for proximity
to a church, school, or residence to be the sole basis for denial of a beer
and wine permit. A careful reading of the statute indicates that the
legislature intended such proximity to be only one factor, not necessarily
the determinative factor, in evaluating the suitability of a proposed
location. 6
In Moore v. South Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Commission67 the
South Carolina Court of Appeals addressed essentially the same issue
confronting the Byers court, but the court of appeals reached exactly the
opposite conclusion. 6 The court in Moore interpreted the 1986 amend-
ment69 as merely allowing the Commission to consider the proximity of
churches and schools as one factor in determining the suitability of the
proposed business.'0 The court refused to hold "that the mere proximity
of a school or church to the location is a sufficient basis on which to
deny a permit."71 Judge Goolsby, writing for the court in Moore,
reasoned that, had the legislature intended for closeness to a church or
school alone to be a sufficient ground for denial of a beer and wine
permit, it would have used language similar to that in the statute
governing the issuance of licenses for the retail sale of alcoholic
liquors.' Arguably, because the legislature did not adopt such a fixed
65. Id. at 245-46, 407 S.E.2d at 655. The legislature amended § 61-9-320 in its
session following the Port Oil decision. Id. at 245, 407 S.E.2d at 655.
66. "Mhe Commission may consider, among other factors, as indications of
unsuitable location, the proximity to residences, schools, playgrounds, and churches
... ." S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-9-320(6) (Law. Co-op. 1990) (emphasis added).
67. 304 S.C. 356, 404 S.E.2d 714 (Ct. App. 1991), vacated, 417 S.E.2d 555
(S.C. 1992).
68. Id. at 360, 404 S.E.2d at 716.
69. Act of Apr. 21, 1986, No. 374, 1986 S.C. Acts 2654 (codified as amended
at S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-9-320 (Law. Co-op. 1990)).
70. Moore, 304 S.C. at 360, 404 S.E.2d at 716. The Moore court determined
that proximity to a church or school could be a legitimate basis for denial of a beer
and wine permit "only when the commission, after considering all pertinent
circumstances, makes findings of fact, supported by substantial evidence, that the sale
of beer or wine at the location is likely to be detrimental to the public interest
because of its proximity to a school or church." Id. at 361, 404 S.E.2d at 717.
71. Id. (citing Smith v. Pratt, 258 S.C. 504, 189 S.E.2d 301 (1972); Port Oil
Co. v. Allen, 286 S.C. 286, 332 S.E.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1985)).
72. Id. Section 61-3-440 of the South Carolina Code provides that no license for
the retail sale of alcoholic liquor shall be granted "if the place of business is within
three hundred feet of any church, school, or playground situated within a municipali-
ty or within five hundred feet of any church, school or playground situated outside
of a municipality." S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-3-440 (Law. Co-op. 1990). See generally
48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors §§ 95, 96 (1981) (discussing restrictions on liquor
businesses based on proximity to schools or churches); 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating
Liquors §§ 140-42 (1969) (same).
(Vol. 44
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standard for the sale of beer and wine, it believed that the retail sale of
beer or wine, unlike liquor, "is not necessarily obnoxious to a school or
church under all conditions and in every instance.""
Byers is inconsistent with other previous South Carolina decisions
relating to the issuance of retail beer and wine permits. For example, in
Kearney v. Allen74 the court expressly declared that the determination of
the suitability of a location for the sale of beer and wine "is not solely
a function of geography. It involves an infinite variety of considerations
related to the nature and operation of the proposed business and its
impact on the community wherein it is to be situated. ""
The Byers decision attempts to clarify the proper grounds on which
the Commission may find a proposed location unsuitable for beer and
wine sales. However, the court may have gone beyond the legislative
intent of section 61-9-320. After Byers, a practitioner representing an
applicant for a beer and wine permit in South Carolina must persuade the
ABC Commission at the initial hearing that the proposed location is
proper despite the location's proximity to a church, school, or residence.
Once the Commission determines that the location is improper because
of the closeness to a church, school, or residence, a reviewing court
likely will not disturb that finding.
David E. Rothstein
III. PHYSICIAN ENTITLED TO PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS IN REAPPLICATION FOR HOSPITAL PRIVILEGES
In Huellmantel v. Greenville Hospital System7 6 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals held that a physician's interest in reappointment to a
hospital staff is a property interest that may not be denied without due
73. Moore, 304 -S.C. at 360-61, 404 S.E.2d at 716-17 (citing Stewart v.
Delaware Liquor Comm'n, 74 A.2d 472 (Del. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1950)).
The Byers court's interpretation of § 61-9-320 as amended would allow the
following illogical result: The Commission could deny a beer and wine permit for an
establishment because it is situated one-half mile from a church and seven-tenths of
a mile from a school, see supra text accompanying note 49; however, the Commis-
sion could grant a liquor license to the same business because the church and school
are more than five hundred feet from the proposed location. See S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 61-3-440 (Law. Co-op. 1990). It is doubtful that the legislature intended to provide
a community greater protection from beer and wine outlets than from retail liquor
establishments. See, e.g., Smith v. Pratt, 258 S.C. 504, 510, 189 S.E.2d 301, 303
(1972).
74. 287 S.C. 324, 338 S.E.2d 335 (1985).
75. Id. at 326-27, 338 S.E.2d at 337 (citing Schudel v. South Carolina Alcoholic
Beverage Control Comm'n, 276 S.C. 138, 142, 276 S.E.2d 308, 310 (1981)).
76. 303 S.C. 549, 402 S.E.2d 489 (Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
1992]
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process.' The court generally discussed acceptable hospital procedures,
but did not significantly modify this area of the law in South Carolina.
In May 1988, Dr. Alan B. Huellmantel applied for reappointment
to the medical staff of the Greenville Hospital System ("Hospital"). The
application asked Huellmantel whether he had voluntarily relinquished his
staff privileges or had them revoked at any member hospital. Dr.
Huellmantel responded negatively to these questions. However, the
Hospital inquired about Dr. Huellmantel's status at St. Francis Hospital
in Greenville and discovered that St. Francis terminated Dr. Huellman-
tel's privileges in July 1987 for failure to comply with recordkeeping
procedures.78
On July 12, 1988, Dr. Huellmantel met with Dr. Chandler, the
chairman of the Hospital's Credentials Committee. At the meeting Dr.
Huellmantel denied being terminated by St. Francis and promised to
provide documents that would clarify the situation. However, Dr.
Chandler had not received these documents when the Credentials
Committee met approximately two weeks later. After considering Dr.
Huellmantel's application and Dr. Chandler's report of his meeting with
Dr. Huellmantel, the Credentials Committee recommended that the
application be denied.79
Dr. Huellmantel then requested a hearing, which was held on
October 18, 1988 before a panel of five physicians. The Hearing
Committee recommended denial of Dr. Huellmantel's application.
Furthermore, it recommended that Dr. Huellmantel not be allowed to
reapply for a period of one year and that he be required to undergo
psychiatric evaluation and treatment before reapplying."0 The Hospital's
Medical Staff Council adopted the recommendations of the Hearing
Committee, and Dr. Huellmantel appealed to the Hospital's Board of
Trustees. After the Board approved the recommendation of the Medical
Staff Council, Dr. Huellmantel brought an action alleging that the
Hospital's actions deprived him of his due process rights.8" The trial
court found that the Hospital had not denied Dr. Huellmantel's due
process rights.Y
The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. 83 First,
the court recognized that physicians have a property interest in being
77. Id. at 553, 402 S.E.2d at 491. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no
state shall "deprive any person of... property without due process of law." U.S.
CONST.. amend XIV, § 1.
78. Huellmantel, 303 S.C. at 551, 402 S.E.2d at 490. St. Francis also indicated
that Dr. Huellmantel may have provided substandard care to patients. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 551-52, 402 S.E.2d at 491.
81. Id. at 552, 402 S.E.2d at 491.
82. Id. at 551, 402 S.E.2d at 490.
83. Id. at 555, 402 S.E.2d at 493.
[Vol. 44
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reappointed to a hospital's staff, and that a hospital may not deny
privileges without complying with the procedural and substantive due
process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Although
procedural due process requirements are not technical, the following
elements must be present: "(1) adequate notice, (2) adequate opportunity
for a hearing, (3) the right to introduce evidence, and (4) the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses." 5 The court further noted that
substantive due process requires only that a public hospital refrain from
denying privileges to a physician "by rules or acts which are unreason-
able, arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory." 6 Thus, if a hospital
follows the procedural requirements and does not act in an arbitrary or
capricious manner, the court will not examine the hospital's administra-
tive decisions.'
The court held that the Hospital afforded Dr. Huellmantel due
process before denying his application for reappointment and requiring
that he wait a year before reapplying. 8 The court reasoned that the
Hospital gave Dr. Huellmantel thirty-days notice of the time and place
of his hearing and adequate notice of the charges against him. The
Hospital also provided Dr. Huellmantel with copies of the documents that
the Medical Staff Council considered in making its decision. Additional-
ly, the Hospital gave Dr. Huellmantel the opportunity at the hearing to
introduce evidence and call witnesses, and to cross-examine the
Hospital's witness.8 9 Furthermore, the record contained no evidence that
the Hospital acted in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious manner.
The Hospital based its decision on reports from another hospital, the
testimony of unbiased physicians, and Dr. Huellmantel's admission that
he had placed an incorrect answer on his application. Accordingly, the
court held that the Hospital's denial of reappointment and the one-year
waiting period before reapplication did not violate Dr. Huellmantel's due
process rights. 9'
However, the court held that the Hospital did violate Dr. Huellman-
tel's procedural due process rights by requiring him to undergo a
psychiatric evaluation and treatment before he could reapply for staff
privileges. 91 The court focused on the fact that Dr. Huellmantel had no
84. Id. at 553, 402 S.E.2d at 491 (citing In re Zaman, 285 S.C. 345,329 S.E.2d
436 (1985)).
85. Id. (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 553, 402 S.E.2d at 492 (citing Zaman, 285 S.C. at 347, 329 S.E.2d
at 437).
87. Id. (citing Lew v. Kona Hosp., 754 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir. 1985)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 553-54, 402 S.E.2d at 492.
90. Id.
91. Id. Although the court did not specify that the Hospital violated only Dr.
*Huellmantel's procedural due process rights, its discussion supports this contention.
See id. at 555, 402 S.E.2d at 492.
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notice that his mental stability was in question or that psychiatric
evaluation might be a prerequisite for reappointment.' Moreover, the
structure of the Hospital's hearing process prevented Dr. Huellmantel
from receiving a full and fair hearing on his mental stability once his
application reached appellate review before the Hospital's Board of
Trustees. 3
The due process guidelines applied by the Huellmantel court are
generally consistent with other jurisdictions. I However, South Carolina
courts have offered very few policy reasons to support these guidelines.
For example, the Huellmantel court cited In re Zaman95 for the proposi-
tion that a physician has a property interest in being appointed to a
hospital staff, but Zaman neither states this proposition directly nor
provides any policy arguments to support the proposition.
96
In contrast to the absolute property right that the South Carolina
courts seem to have granted to physicians, the Eleventh Circuit has
required that a physician show his interest in obtaining additional hospital
privileges is constitutionally protected: A physician "'must have more
than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it.'" 97 Under this test, a physician must show an entitle-
ment under state law, e.g., a contractual right, to the privilege before the
physician may assert a claim for a due process violation of that privi-
lege. 98 In Todorov the court disallowed the physician's due process claim
because the physician failed to show that he was entitled under state law
to obtain additional staff privileges:
99
Furthermore, South Carolina courts have not addressed the
important balance between the physician's interests and the public's
interest. In Rhee v. El Camino Hospital District'° the California Court
of Appeals reasoned that "[a] physician's right to pursue his livelihood
free from arbitrary exclusionary practices must be balanced against other
competing interests: the interest of members of the public in receiving
92. Id. at 554, 402 S.E.2d at 492.
93. Id. at 555, 402 S.E.2d at 492. Under the Hospital's appellate procedure, Dr.
Huellmantel could not call witnesses to support his mental stability. Id.
94. See, e.g., Branch v. Hempstead County Memorial Hosp., 539 F. Supp. 908
(W.D. Ark. 1982) (mem.); Huntsville Memorial Hosp. v. Ernst, 763 S.W.2d 856
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
95. 285 S.C. 345, 329 S.E.2d 436 (1985).
96. Id. at 347, 329 S.E.2d at 437.
97. Todorovv. DCHHealthcareAuth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1462-63 (1lth Cir. 1991)
(quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
98. Id. at 1463.
99. See id. at 1463-64.
100. 247 Cal. Rptr. 244 (Ct. App. 1988).
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quality medical care, and the duty of the hospital . . . to provide
competent staff physicians."101
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court has previously stated
that "licensed physicians do not have an unqualified right to practice
medicine in public hospitals,"" neither the supreme court nor the
court of appeals has elaborated upon what those qualifications are. The
Huellmantel decision does not enumerate the situations in which a
physician has a property interest in staff privileges, nor does the opinion
address the possible conflicts arising between a physicians's property
right and the public's right to quality medical care. The decision,
therefore, adds little to this area of the law in South Carolina.
Donna J. Branning
101. Id. at 250.
102. In re Zaman, 285 S.C. 345, 347, 329 S.E.2d 436, 437 (1985).
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